AS56393 ASPA Check - FRYS IX Arend Brouwer

FRYS-IX Arend Brouwer🇳🇱 - ASPA check for AS56393: the upstream transit providers AS56393 has authorized in its RPKI Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) object, and the networks that list AS56393 as their provider. Routers that validate ASPA use these records to detect route leaks in BGP paths.

AS56393 has not published its own ASPA object, but 4 ASNs list it as an authorized upstream provider.

Listed as Upstream By
4 ASNs
Upstream Providers
-
Downstream Customers
4

Peering Topology

AS56393 peering topology: 0 upstream providers and 4 downstream customersNo upstreams. Downstreams: AS6823, AS205755, AS207994, AS215665.AS56393 - FRYS-IX Arend BrouwerAS56393FRYS-IX Arend BrouwerAS6823TR-3C1B-TELEKOM 3C1B …AS6823 - TR-3C1B-TELEKOM 3C1B Telekomunikasyon ve Internet Hiz. San. ve Tic. A.S.AS205755Sdnbucks SDNBUCKS BVAS205755 - Sdnbucks SDNBUCKS BVAS207994Blockchain-Creek Bloc…AS207994 - Blockchain-Creek Blockchain Creek B.V.AS215665MARLONALKAN-AS Marlon…AS215665 - MARLONALKAN-AS Marlon AlkanUPSTREAMSDOWNSTREAMS

Downstream Customers(4)

These ASNs list AS56393 as an authorized upstream provider.

ASNName
AS6823🇹🇷TR-3C1B-TELEKOM 3C1B Telekomunikasyon ve Internet Hiz. San. ve Tic. A.S.
AS205755🇳🇱Sdnbucks SDNBUCKS BV
AS207994🇧🇪Blockchain-Creek Blockchain Creek B.V.
AS215665🇩🇪MARLONALKAN-AS Marlon Alkan
About ASPA - what it is and why AS56393 should publish one

ASPA (Autonomous System Provider Authorization) is a cryptographically signed RPKI object specified in the IETF draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile that lets an AS declare which upstream networks are its authorized transit providers. Together with route origin validation (ROV), ASPA enables BGP route leak detection: routers can reject AS-paths in which a network appears as a provider without being authorized. Route leaks are a frequent cause of large routing incidents, and ROV alone cannot detect them because the origin of a leaked route is correct.

AS56393 (FRYS-IX Arend Brouwer) has not published an ASPA object. Hops through it are therefore "unknown" to ASPA validation - not invalid, but not protected either. An ASPA object lists every transit provider of the network (or AS0 if it has none) and is created in the RIR's hosted RPKI where ASPA is supported, or in a delegated RPKI setup. For most networks the record is a short list of their upstream ASNs.

Create an ASPA object: RIPE Portal · ARIN RPKI · APNIC MyAPNIC · ipctl.io RPKI & ROA tools

Related Tools and Guides

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