AS577 ASPA Check - Bell Canada

BACOM - Bell Canada🇨🇦 - ASPA check for AS577: the upstream transit providers AS577 has authorized in its RPKI Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) object, and the networks that list AS577 as their provider. Routers that validate ASPA use these records to detect route leaks in BGP paths.

AS577 has not published its own ASPA object, but 5 ASNs list it as an authorized upstream provider.

Listed as Upstream By
5 ASNs
Upstream Providers
-
Downstream Customers
5

Downstream Customers(5)

These ASNs list AS577 as an authorized upstream provider.

ASNName
AS11239🇨🇦SKYCOMP-01 - Skycomp Solutions Inc.
AS32586🇨🇦NIAGARA-WIRELESS-INTERNET-COMPANY - Niagara Wireless Internet Co.
AS53820🇨🇦CSUR - Coop de solidarite du Suroit-CSUR
AS394023🇨🇦OLDS-COLLEGE - Olds College
AS395759🇨🇦RESOLUTE-FP-CANADA-INC - Resolute FP Canada Inc.
About ASPA - what it is and why AS577 should publish one

ASPA (Autonomous System Provider Authorization) is a cryptographically signed RPKI object specified in the IETF draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile that lets an AS declare which upstream networks are its authorized transit providers. Together with route origin validation (ROV), ASPA enables BGP route leak detection: routers can reject AS-paths in which a network appears as a provider without being authorized. Route leaks are a frequent cause of large routing incidents, and ROV alone cannot detect them because the origin of a leaked route is correct.

AS577 (BACOM - Bell Canada) has not published an ASPA object. Hops through it are therefore "unknown" to ASPA validation - not invalid, but not protected either. An ASPA object lists every transit provider of the network (or AS0 if it has none) and is created in the RIR's hosted RPKI where ASPA is supported, or in a delegated RPKI setup. For most networks the record is a short list of their upstream ASNs.

Create an ASPA object: RIPE Portal · ARIN RPKI · APNIC MyAPNIC · ipctl.io RPKI & ROA tools

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