AS59360 ASPA Check - BBIXHK HK BBIX HONG KONG

BBIXHK-HK BBIX HONG KONG🇭🇰 - ASPA check for AS59360: the upstream transit providers AS59360 has authorized in its RPKI Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) object, and the networks that list AS59360 as their provider. Routers that validate ASPA use these records to detect route leaks in BGP paths.

AS59360 has not published its own ASPA object, but 4 ASNs list it as an authorized upstream provider.

Listed as Upstream By
4 ASNs
Upstream Providers
-
Downstream Customers
4

Downstream Customers(4)

These ASNs list AS59360 as an authorized upstream provider.

ASNName
AS7629🇵🇭EPLDT-AS-AP 5F L.V. Locsin Bldg
AS23930🇵🇭VITROINC-AS-AP VITRO INC.
AS24221🇵🇭EPLDT-AZURE-STACK ePLDT Azure Stack
AS38491🇵🇭VITROINC-AS-AP VITRO INC.
About ASPA - what it is and why AS59360 should publish one

ASPA (Autonomous System Provider Authorization) is a cryptographically signed RPKI object specified in the IETF draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile that lets an AS declare which upstream networks are its authorized transit providers. Together with route origin validation (ROV), ASPA enables BGP route leak detection: routers can reject AS-paths in which a network appears as a provider without being authorized. Route leaks are a frequent cause of large routing incidents, and ROV alone cannot detect them because the origin of a leaked route is correct.

AS59360 (BBIXHK-HK BBIX HONG KONG) has not published an ASPA object. Hops through it are therefore "unknown" to ASPA validation - not invalid, but not protected either. An ASPA object lists every transit provider of the network (or AS0 if it has none) and is created in the RIR's hosted RPKI where ASPA is supported, or in a delegated RPKI setup. For most networks the record is a short list of their upstream ASNs.

Create an ASPA object: RIPE Portal · ARIN RPKI · APNIC MyAPNIC · ipctl.io RPKI & ROA tools

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