AS62255 ASPA Check - BEMYLINK BiMajLink D.O.O

BEMYLINK BiMajLink d.o.o.🇸🇮 - ASPA check for AS62255: the upstream transit providers AS62255 has authorized in its RPKI Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) object, and the networks that list AS62255 as their provider. Routers that validate ASPA use these records to detect route leaks in BGP paths.

AS62255 has not published its own ASPA object, but 13 ASNs list it as an authorized upstream provider.

Listed as Upstream By
13 ASNs
Upstream Providers
-
Downstream Customers
13

Peering Topology

AS62255 peering topology: 0 upstream providers and 13 downstream customersNo upstreams. Downstreams: AS49418, AS62379, AS197974, AS199742, AS200993, AS203154, AS205421, AS207567 and more.AS62255 - BEMYLINK BiMajLink d.o.o.AS62255BEMYLINK BiMajLink d.…AS49418AS-NETSHIELD NETSHIEL…AS49418 - AS-NETSHIELD NETSHIELD LTDAS62379FREEWAY FREEWAY LLCAS62379 - FREEWAY FREEWAY LLCAS197974PLYM-AS Vladislav Nit…AS197974 - PLYM-AS Vladislav NitsenkoAS199742Akenai-Products-AS Ak…AS199742 - Akenai-Products-AS Akenai Products LTDAS200993NyaCore Yanislav Basi…AS200993 - NyaCore Yanislav BasiukAS203154MITELIS-DOWNSTREAM MI…AS203154 - MITELIS-DOWNSTREAM MITELIS SECURITY LIMITEDAS205421SCULKSOFT-AS Sculk So…AS205421 - SCULKSOFT-AS Sculk Software LLCAS207567INTEZIONET-AS Intezio…AS207567 - INTEZIONET-AS Intezio Worldwide LimitedView all 13 downstreams →UPSTREAMSDOWNSTREAMS

Downstream Customers(13)

These ASNs list AS62255 as an authorized upstream provider.

ASNName
AS49418🇬🇧AS-NETSHIELD NETSHIELD LTD
AS62379🇷🇺FREEWAY FREEWAY LLC
AS197974🇪🇪PLYM-AS Vladislav Nitsenko
AS199742🇬🇧Akenai-Products-AS Akenai Products LTD
AS200993🇷🇺NyaCore Yanislav Basiuk
AS203154🇬🇧MITELIS-DOWNSTREAM MITELIS SECURITY LIMITED
AS205421🇷🇺SCULKSOFT-AS Sculk Software LLC
AS207567🇬🇧INTEZIONET-AS Intezio Worldwide Limited
AS208824🇪🇸POLOPRO Pau Cab
AS209693🇬🇧OC-NETWORK OC NETWORKS LIMITED
13 total
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About ASPA - what it is and why AS62255 should publish one

ASPA (Autonomous System Provider Authorization) is a cryptographically signed RPKI object specified in the IETF draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile that lets an AS declare which upstream networks are its authorized transit providers. Together with route origin validation (ROV), ASPA enables BGP route leak detection: routers can reject AS-paths in which a network appears as a provider without being authorized. Route leaks are a frequent cause of large routing incidents, and ROV alone cannot detect them because the origin of a leaked route is correct.

AS62255 (BEMYLINK BiMajLink d.o.o.) has not published an ASPA object. Hops through it are therefore "unknown" to ASPA validation - not invalid, but not protected either. An ASPA object lists every transit provider of the network (or AS0 if it has none) and is created in the RIR's hosted RPKI where ASPA is supported, or in a delegated RPKI setup. For most networks the record is a short list of their upstream ASNs.

Create an ASPA object: RIPE Portal · ARIN RPKI · APNIC MyAPNIC · ipctl.io RPKI & ROA tools

Related Tools and Guides

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