AS62748 ASPA Check

ASPA check for AS62748: the upstream transit providers AS62748 has authorized in its RPKI Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) object, and the networks that list AS62748 as their provider. Routers that validate ASPA use these records to detect route leaks in BGP paths.

AS62748 has not published its own ASPA object, but 1 ASN lists it as an authorized upstream provider.

Listed as Upstream By
1 ASN
Upstream Providers
-
Downstream Customers
1

Peering Topology

AS62748 peering topology: 0 upstream providers and 1 downstream customerNo upstreams. Downstreams: AS202335.AS62748 - AS62748AS202335HAIMA-AS Zhanrui TianAS202335 - HAIMA-AS Zhanrui TianUPSTREAMSDOWNSTREAMS

Downstream Customers(1)

These ASNs list AS62748 as an authorized upstream provider.

ASNName
AS202335🇨🇳HAIMA-AS Zhanrui Tian
About ASPA - what it is and why AS62748 should publish one

ASPA (Autonomous System Provider Authorization) is a cryptographically signed RPKI object specified in the IETF draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile that lets an AS declare which upstream networks are its authorized transit providers. Together with route origin validation (ROV), ASPA enables BGP route leak detection: routers can reject AS-paths in which a network appears as a provider without being authorized. Route leaks are a frequent cause of large routing incidents, and ROV alone cannot detect them because the origin of a leaked route is correct.

AS62748 has not published an ASPA object. Hops through it are therefore "unknown" to ASPA validation - not invalid, but not protected either. An ASPA object lists every transit provider of the network (or AS0 if it has none) and is created in the RIR's hosted RPKI where ASPA is supported, or in a delegated RPKI setup. For most networks the record is a short list of their upstream ASNs.

Create an ASPA object: RIPE Portal · ARIN RPKI · APNIC MyAPNIC · ipctl.io RPKI & ROA tools

Related Tools and Guides

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