AS6327 ASPA Check - Shaw Communications

SHAW - Shaw Communications🇨🇦 - ASPA check for AS6327: the upstream transit providers AS6327 has authorized in its RPKI Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) object, and the networks that list AS6327 as their provider. Routers that validate ASPA use these records to detect route leaks in BGP paths.

AS6327 has not published its own ASPA object, but 4 ASNs list it as an authorized upstream provider.

Listed as Upstream By
4 ASNs
Upstream Providers
-
Downstream Customers
4

Downstream Customers(4)

These ASNs list AS6327 as an authorized upstream provider.

ASNName
AS33234🇺🇸SJOBERGS-INC - Sjoberg's Inc
AS398898🇨🇦DEVRY - DeVry Greenhouses
AS399580🇨🇦RADISHNETWORKS-NET-01 - Radish Networks
AS401723🇨🇦PRIMECORP - PRIMECorp Police Records Information Management Environment Incorporated
About ASPA - what it is and why AS6327 should publish one

ASPA (Autonomous System Provider Authorization) is a cryptographically signed RPKI object specified in the IETF draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile that lets an AS declare which upstream networks are its authorized transit providers. Together with route origin validation (ROV), ASPA enables BGP route leak detection: routers can reject AS-paths in which a network appears as a provider without being authorized. Route leaks are a frequent cause of large routing incidents, and ROV alone cannot detect them because the origin of a leaked route is correct.

AS6327 (SHAW - Shaw Communications) has not published an ASPA object. Hops through it are therefore "unknown" to ASPA validation - not invalid, but not protected either. An ASPA object lists every transit provider of the network (or AS0 if it has none) and is created in the RIR's hosted RPKI where ASPA is supported, or in a delegated RPKI setup. For most networks the record is a short list of their upstream ASNs.

Create an ASPA object: RIPE Portal · ARIN RPKI · APNIC MyAPNIC · ipctl.io RPKI & ROA tools

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