AS8359 ASPA Check - MTS PJSC

MTS MTS PJSC🇷🇺 - ASPA check for AS8359: the upstream transit providers AS8359 has authorized in its RPKI Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) object, and the networks that list AS8359 as their provider. Routers that validate ASPA use these records to detect route leaks in BGP paths.

AS8359 has not published its own ASPA object, but 7 ASNs list it as an authorized upstream provider.

Listed as Upstream By
7 ASNs
Upstream Providers
-
Downstream Customers
7

Peering Topology

AS8359 peering topology: 0 upstream providers and 7 downstream customersNo upstreams. Downstreams: AS3327, AS4594, AS18001, AS44534, AS49814, AS131314, AS197068.AS8359 - MTS MTS PJSCAS8359MTS MTS PJSCAS3327CITIC CITIC Telecom C…AS3327 - CITIC CITIC Telecom CPC Netherlands B.V.AS4594HKISL-ASN - Internet …AS4594 - HKISL-ASN - Internet Solutions LimitedAS18001DIALOG-AS - Dialog Ax…AS18001 - DIALOG-AS - Dialog Axiata PLC.AS44534yandex-office YANDEX …AS44534 - yandex-office YANDEX LLCAS49814TOMGATE-AS TomGate LLCAS49814 - TOMGATE-AS TomGate LLCAS131314CBC-AS-AP - CBC Tech …AS131314 - CBC-AS-AP - CBC Tech International LimitedAS197068CURATOR HLL LLCAS197068 - CURATOR HLL LLCUPSTREAMSDOWNSTREAMS

Downstream Customers(7)

These ASNs list AS8359 as an authorized upstream provider.

ASNName
AS3327🇳🇱CITIC CITIC Telecom CPC Netherlands B.V.
AS4594🇭🇰HKISL-ASN - Internet Solutions Limited
AS18001🇱🇰DIALOG-AS - Dialog Axiata PLC.
AS44534🇷🇺yandex-office YANDEX LLC
AS49814🇷🇺TOMGATE-AS TomGate LLC
AS131314🇭🇰CBC-AS-AP - CBC Tech International Limited
AS197068🇷🇺CURATOR HLL LLC
About ASPA - what it is and why AS8359 should publish one

ASPA (Autonomous System Provider Authorization) is a cryptographically signed RPKI object specified in the IETF draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile that lets an AS declare which upstream networks are its authorized transit providers. Together with route origin validation (ROV), ASPA enables BGP route leak detection: routers can reject AS-paths in which a network appears as a provider without being authorized. Route leaks are a frequent cause of large routing incidents, and ROV alone cannot detect them because the origin of a leaked route is correct.

AS8359 (MTS MTS PJSC) has not published an ASPA object. Hops through it are therefore "unknown" to ASPA validation - not invalid, but not protected either. An ASPA object lists every transit provider of the network (or AS0 if it has none) and is created in the RIR's hosted RPKI where ASPA is supported, or in a delegated RPKI setup. For most networks the record is a short list of their upstream ASNs.

Create an ASPA object: RIPE Portal · ARIN RPKI · APNIC MyAPNIC · ipctl.io RPKI & ROA tools

Related Tools and Guides

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