AS8708 ASPA Check - DIGI RO DIGI ROMANIA S.A

DIGI-RO DIGI ROMANIA S.A.🇷🇴 - ASPA check for AS8708: the upstream transit providers AS8708 has authorized in its RPKI Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) object, and the networks that list AS8708 as their provider. Routers that validate ASPA use these records to detect route leaks in BGP paths.

AS8708 has not published its own ASPA object, but 11 ASNs list it as an authorized upstream provider.

Listed as Upstream By
11 ASNs
Upstream Providers
-
Downstream Customers
11

Peering Topology

AS8708 peering topology: 0 upstream providers and 11 downstream customersNo upstreams. Downstreams: AS31454, AS43046, AS48112, AS49468, AS49935, AS57050, AS59632, AS61120 and more.AS8708 - DIGI-RO DIGI ROMANIA S.A.AS8708DIGI-RO DIGI ROMANIA …AS31454FLANCO-AS FLANCO RETA…AS31454 - FLANCO-AS FLANCO RETAIL SAAS43046DEVICE-SYSTEMS Device…AS43046 - DEVICE-SYSTEMS Device Systems SRLAS48112XINDI-AS XINDI Networ…AS48112 - XINDI-AS XINDI Networks SRLAS49468MAGHOST_RO MAGITST SRLAS49468 - MAGHOST_RO MAGITST SRLAS49935SmartEye SmartEye B.VAS49935 - SmartEye SmartEye B.VAS57050DREAMSERVER-SRL Dream…AS57050 - DREAMSERVER-SRL DreamServer S.R.L.AS59632PIDGINHOST-AS SC PIDG…AS59632 - PIDGINHOST-AS SC PIDGIN HOST SRLAS61120HOSTBIT Hostbit SRLAS61120 - HOSTBIT Hostbit SRLView all 11 downstreams →UPSTREAMSDOWNSTREAMS

Downstream Customers(11)

These ASNs list AS8708 as an authorized upstream provider.

ASNName
AS31454🇷🇴FLANCO-AS FLANCO RETAIL SA
AS43046🇷🇴DEVICE-SYSTEMS Device Systems SRL
AS48112🇷🇴XINDI-AS XINDI Networks SRL
AS49468🇷🇴MAGHOST_RO MAGIT'ST SRL
AS49935🇧🇪SmartEye SmartEye B.V
AS57050🇷🇴DREAMSERVER-SRL DreamServer S.R.L.
AS59632🇷🇴PIDGINHOST-AS SC PIDGIN HOST SRL
AS61120🇷🇴HOSTBIT Hostbit SRL
AS61278🇷🇴FIRSTIT-AS Alttab Profit SRL
AS203992🇷🇴NOVANEX-AS NOVANEX SRL
11 total
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About ASPA - what it is and why AS8708 should publish one

ASPA (Autonomous System Provider Authorization) is a cryptographically signed RPKI object specified in the IETF draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile that lets an AS declare which upstream networks are its authorized transit providers. Together with route origin validation (ROV), ASPA enables BGP route leak detection: routers can reject AS-paths in which a network appears as a provider without being authorized. Route leaks are a frequent cause of large routing incidents, and ROV alone cannot detect them because the origin of a leaked route is correct.

AS8708 (DIGI-RO DIGI ROMANIA S.A.) has not published an ASPA object. Hops through it are therefore "unknown" to ASPA validation - not invalid, but not protected either. An ASPA object lists every transit provider of the network (or AS0 if it has none) and is created in the RIR's hosted RPKI where ASPA is supported, or in a delegated RPKI setup. For most networks the record is a short list of their upstream ASNs.

Create an ASPA object: RIPE Portal · ARIN RPKI · APNIC MyAPNIC · ipctl.io RPKI & ROA tools

Related Tools and Guides

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