AS8714 ASPA Check - LINX ROUTESRV London Internet Exchange

LINX-ROUTESRV London Internet Exchange Ltd.🇬🇧 - ASPA check for AS8714: the upstream transit providers AS8714 has authorized in its RPKI Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) object, and the networks that list AS8714 as their provider. Routers that validate ASPA use these records to detect route leaks in BGP paths.

AS8714 has not published its own ASPA object, but 3 ASNs list it as an authorized upstream provider.

Listed as Upstream By
3 ASNs
Upstream Providers
-
Downstream Customers
3

Peering Topology

AS8714 peering topology: 0 upstream providers and 3 downstream customersNo upstreams. Downstreams: AS41379, AS56665, AS216096.AS8714 - LINX-ROUTESRV London Internet Exchange Ltd.AS8714LINX-ROUTESRV London …AS41379NTA-AS Nationwide Tel…AS41379 - NTA-AS Nationwide Telephone Assistance LtdAS56665TANGO-PROXIMUS_NXT Pr…AS56665 - TANGO-PROXIMUS_NXT Proximus Luxembourg S.A.AS216096SECUREPEAK Alex Terra…AS216096 - SECUREPEAK Alex Terrats Ciberseguretat SLUUPSTREAMSDOWNSTREAMS

Downstream Customers(3)

These ASNs list AS8714 as an authorized upstream provider.

ASNName
AS41379🇬🇧NTA-AS Nationwide Telephone Assistance Ltd
AS56665🇱🇺TANGO-PROXIMUS_NXT Proximus Luxembourg S.A.
AS216096🇦🇩SECUREPEAK Alex Terrats Ciberseguretat SLU
About ASPA - what it is and why AS8714 should publish one

ASPA (Autonomous System Provider Authorization) is a cryptographically signed RPKI object specified in the IETF draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile that lets an AS declare which upstream networks are its authorized transit providers. Together with route origin validation (ROV), ASPA enables BGP route leak detection: routers can reject AS-paths in which a network appears as a provider without being authorized. Route leaks are a frequent cause of large routing incidents, and ROV alone cannot detect them because the origin of a leaked route is correct.

AS8714 (LINX-ROUTESRV London Internet Exchange Ltd.) has not published an ASPA object. Hops through it are therefore "unknown" to ASPA validation - not invalid, but not protected either. An ASPA object lists every transit provider of the network (or AS0 if it has none) and is created in the RIR's hosted RPKI where ASPA is supported, or in a delegated RPKI setup. For most networks the record is a short list of their upstream ASNs.

Create an ASPA object: RIPE Portal · ARIN RPKI · APNIC MyAPNIC · ipctl.io RPKI & ROA tools

Related Tools and Guides

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