AS9009 ASPA Check - M247 Europe

M247 M247 Europe SRL🇷🇴 - ASPA check for AS9009: the upstream transit providers AS9009 has authorized in its RPKI Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) object, and the networks that list AS9009 as their provider. Routers that validate ASPA use these records to detect route leaks in BGP paths.

AS9009 has not published its own ASPA object, but 7 ASNs list it as an authorized upstream provider.

Listed as Upstream By
7 ASNs
Upstream Providers
-
Downstream Customers
7

Peering Topology

AS9009 peering topology: 0 upstream providers and 7 downstream customersNo upstreams. Downstreams: AS18001, AS49203, AS49935, AS57511, AS59795, AS131314, AS200325.AS9009 - M247 M247 Europe SRLAS9009M247 M247 Europe SRLAS18001DIALOG-AS - Dialog Ax…AS18001 - DIALOG-AS - Dialog Axiata PLC.AS49203EAD-AS EAD.RO INTERAC…AS49203 - EAD-AS EAD.RO INTERACTIVE SRLAS49935SmartEye SmartEye B.VAS49935 - SmartEye SmartEye B.VAS57511ITEL-AS-NUMBER Innova…AS57511 - ITEL-AS-NUMBER Innovative Telecom Systems FZEAS59795PerfGrid Lucas Rolff …AS59795 - PerfGrid Lucas Rolff trading as PerfGridAS131314CBC-AS-AP - CBC Tech …AS131314 - CBC-AS-AP - CBC Tech International LimitedAS200325BunnyCDN BUNNYWAY, in…AS200325 - BunnyCDN BUNNYWAY, informacijske storitve d.o.o.UPSTREAMSDOWNSTREAMS

Downstream Customers(7)

These ASNs list AS9009 as an authorized upstream provider.

ASNName
AS18001🇱🇰DIALOG-AS - Dialog Axiata PLC.
AS49203🇷🇴EAD-AS EAD.RO INTERACTIVE SRL
AS49935🇧🇪SmartEye SmartEye B.V
AS57511🇦🇪ITEL-AS-NUMBER Innovative Telecom Systems FZE
AS59795🇳🇱PerfGrid Lucas Rolff trading as PerfGrid
AS131314🇭🇰CBC-AS-AP - CBC Tech International Limited
AS200325🇸🇮BunnyCDN BUNNYWAY, informacijske storitve d.o.o.
About ASPA - what it is and why AS9009 should publish one

ASPA (Autonomous System Provider Authorization) is a cryptographically signed RPKI object specified in the IETF draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile that lets an AS declare which upstream networks are its authorized transit providers. Together with route origin validation (ROV), ASPA enables BGP route leak detection: routers can reject AS-paths in which a network appears as a provider without being authorized. Route leaks are a frequent cause of large routing incidents, and ROV alone cannot detect them because the origin of a leaked route is correct.

AS9009 (M247 M247 Europe SRL) has not published an ASPA object. Hops through it are therefore "unknown" to ASPA validation - not invalid, but not protected either. An ASPA object lists every transit provider of the network (or AS0 if it has none) and is created in the RIR's hosted RPKI where ASPA is supported, or in a delegated RPKI setup. For most networks the record is a short list of their upstream ASNs.

Create an ASPA object: RIPE Portal · ARIN RPKI · APNIC MyAPNIC · ipctl.io RPKI & ROA tools

Related Tools and Guides

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