AS9050 ASPA Check - RTD Orange Romania S.A

RTD Orange Romania S.A.🇷🇴 - ASPA check for AS9050: the upstream transit providers AS9050 has authorized in its RPKI Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) object, and the networks that list AS9050 as their provider. Routers that validate ASPA use these records to detect route leaks in BGP paths.

AS9050 has not published its own ASPA object, but 6 ASNs list it as an authorized upstream provider.

Listed as Upstream By
6 ASNs
Upstream Providers
-
Downstream Customers
6

Peering Topology

AS9050 peering topology: 0 upstream providers and 6 downstream customersNo upstreams. Downstreams: AS31454, AS48453, AS49468, AS59632, AS205031, AS205614.AS9050 - RTD Orange Romania S.A.AS9050RTD Orange Romania S.…AS31454FLANCO-AS FLANCO RETA…AS31454 - FLANCO-AS FLANCO RETAIL SAAS48453CNETWORK-AS CNETWORK …AS48453 - CNETWORK-AS CNETWORK SRLAS49468MAGHOST_RO MAGITST SRLAS49468 - MAGHOST_RO MAGITST SRLAS59632PIDGINHOST-AS SC PIDG…AS59632 - PIDGINHOST-AS SC PIDGIN HOST SRLAS205031DIGITAL-INFRA-RO-AS U…AS205031 - DIGITAL-INFRA-RO-AS UPC DIGITAL INFRASTRUCTURE ROMANIA S.R.L.AS205614medialine-eurotrade-a…AS205614 - medialine-eurotrade-ag Medialine EuroTrade AGUPSTREAMSDOWNSTREAMS

Downstream Customers(6)

These ASNs list AS9050 as an authorized upstream provider.

ASNName
AS31454🇷🇴FLANCO-AS FLANCO RETAIL SA
AS48453🇷🇴CNETWORK-AS CNETWORK SRL
AS49468🇷🇴MAGHOST_RO MAGIT'ST SRL
AS59632🇷🇴PIDGINHOST-AS SC PIDGIN HOST SRL
AS205031🇷🇴DIGITAL-INFRA-RO-AS UPC DIGITAL INFRASTRUCTURE ROMANIA S.R.L.
AS205614🇩🇪medialine-eurotrade-ag Medialine EuroTrade AG
About ASPA - what it is and why AS9050 should publish one

ASPA (Autonomous System Provider Authorization) is a cryptographically signed RPKI object specified in the IETF draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile that lets an AS declare which upstream networks are its authorized transit providers. Together with route origin validation (ROV), ASPA enables BGP route leak detection: routers can reject AS-paths in which a network appears as a provider without being authorized. Route leaks are a frequent cause of large routing incidents, and ROV alone cannot detect them because the origin of a leaked route is correct.

AS9050 (RTD Orange Romania S.A.) has not published an ASPA object. Hops through it are therefore "unknown" to ASPA validation - not invalid, but not protected either. An ASPA object lists every transit provider of the network (or AS0 if it has none) and is created in the RIR's hosted RPKI where ASPA is supported, or in a delegated RPKI setup. For most networks the record is a short list of their upstream ASNs.

Create an ASPA object: RIPE Portal · ARIN RPKI · APNIC MyAPNIC · ipctl.io RPKI & ROA tools

Related Tools and Guides

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