AS213753 ASPA Check - Interedge B.V

interedge InterEdge B.V.🇳🇱 - ASPA check for AS213753: the upstream transit providers AS213753 has authorized in its RPKI Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) object, and the networks that list AS213753 as their provider. Routers that validate ASPA use these records to detect route leaks in BGP paths.

AS213753 has not published its own ASPA object, but 11 ASNs list it as an authorized upstream provider.

Listed as Upstream By
11 ASNs
Upstream Providers
-
Downstream Customers
11

Peering Topology

AS213753 peering topology: 0 upstream providers and 11 downstream customersNo upstreams. Downstreams: AS11967, AS26954, AS60900, AS200993, AS205941, AS210464, AS211623, AS213900 and more.AS213753 - interedge InterEdge B.V.AS213753interedge InterEdge B…AS11967HOP179 Hop179 OUAS11967 - HOP179 Hop179 OUAS26954AS26954 Mikhail Fedor…AS26954 - AS26954 Mikhail FedorovAS60900SsmidgeTechnologies A…AS60900 - SsmidgeTechnologies Adrian Trifonov trading as Ssmidge TechnologiesAS200993NyaCore Yanislav Basi…AS200993 - NyaCore Yanislav BasiukAS205941LSG Lungu Stefan Gabr…AS205941 - LSG Lungu Stefan GabrielAS210464AVSISP ANDREW KRISTULIAS210464 - AVSISP ANDREW KRISTULIAS211623OXAR NAML B.V.AS211623 - OXAR NAML B.V.AS213900rs RS Computers L.L.CAS213900 - rs RS Computers L.L.CView all 11 downstreams →UPSTREAMSDOWNSTREAMS

Downstream Customers(11)

These ASNs list AS213753 as an authorized upstream provider.

ASNName
AS11967🇪🇪HOP179 Hop179 OU
AS26954🇮🇱AS26954 Mikhail Fedorov
AS60900🇨🇦SsmidgeTechnologies Adrian Trifonov trading as Ssmidge Technologies
AS200993🇷🇺NyaCore Yanislav Basiuk
AS205941🇷🇴LSG Lungu Stefan Gabriel
AS210464🇦🇱AVSISP ANDREW KRISTULI
AS211623🇳🇱OXAR NAML B.V.
AS213900🇦🇱rs RS Computers L.L.C
AS214809🇫🇮Stocade Jere Kiitola trading as Stocade
AS215296🇳🇱LOWPING-NL Raoul Brouns is trading as LowPing NL
11 total
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About ASPA - what it is and why AS213753 should publish one

ASPA (Autonomous System Provider Authorization) is a cryptographically signed RPKI object specified in the IETF draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile that lets an AS declare which upstream networks are its authorized transit providers. Together with route origin validation (ROV), ASPA enables BGP route leak detection: routers can reject AS-paths in which a network appears as a provider without being authorized. Route leaks are a frequent cause of large routing incidents, and ROV alone cannot detect them because the origin of a leaked route is correct.

AS213753 (interedge InterEdge B.V.) has not published an ASPA object. Hops through it are therefore "unknown" to ASPA validation - not invalid, but not protected either. An ASPA object lists every transit provider of the network (or AS0 if it has none) and is created in the RIR's hosted RPKI where ASPA is supported, or in a delegated RPKI setup. For most networks the record is a short list of their upstream ASNs.

Create an ASPA object: RIPE Portal · ARIN RPKI · APNIC MyAPNIC · ipctl.io RPKI & ROA tools

Related Tools and Guides

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