AS38074 ASPA Check - SDCC Japan West Area

SDCC-AS-AP - SDCC Japan-West Area🇯🇵 - ASPA check for AS38074: the upstream transit providers AS38074 has authorized in its RPKI Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) object, and the networks that list AS38074 as their provider. Routers that validate ASPA use these records to detect route leaks in BGP paths.

AS38074 has not published its own ASPA object, but 5 ASNs list it as an authorized upstream provider.

Listed as Upstream By
5 ASNs
Upstream Providers
-
Downstream Customers
5

Peering Topology

AS38074 peering topology: 0 upstream providers and 5 downstream customersNo upstreams. Downstreams: AS12198, AS39753, AS44324, AS200455, AS214675.AS38074 - SDCC-AS-AP - SDCC Japan-West AreaAS38074SDCC-AS-AP - SDCC Jap…AS12198JSMSR-LLC - JSMSR Net…AS12198 - JSMSR-LLC - JSMSR NetworkAS39753LIUXYON Kai LiuAS39753 - LIUXYON Kai LiuAS44324MOEDOVE-AS MoeDove LLCAS44324 - MOEDOVE-AS MoeDove LLCAS200455HOTARU-AS HOTARU NETW…AS200455 - HOTARU-AS HOTARU NETWORK LTD.AS214675Starlamp Hidenori Mat…AS214675 - Starlamp Hidenori MatsuoUPSTREAMSDOWNSTREAMS

Downstream Customers(5)

These ASNs list AS38074 as an authorized upstream provider.

ASNName
AS12198🇺🇸JSMSR-LLC - JSMSR Network
AS39753🇨🇳LIUXYON Kai Liu
AS44324🇺🇸MOEDOVE-AS MoeDove LLC
AS200455🇬🇧HOTARU-AS HOTARU NETWORK LTD.
AS214675🇯🇵Starlamp Hidenori Matsuo
About ASPA - what it is and why AS38074 should publish one

ASPA (Autonomous System Provider Authorization) is a cryptographically signed RPKI object specified in the IETF draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile that lets an AS declare which upstream networks are its authorized transit providers. Together with route origin validation (ROV), ASPA enables BGP route leak detection: routers can reject AS-paths in which a network appears as a provider without being authorized. Route leaks are a frequent cause of large routing incidents, and ROV alone cannot detect them because the origin of a leaked route is correct.

AS38074 (SDCC-AS-AP - SDCC Japan-West Area) has not published an ASPA object. Hops through it are therefore "unknown" to ASPA validation - not invalid, but not protected either. An ASPA object lists every transit provider of the network (or AS0 if it has none) and is created in the RIR's hosted RPKI where ASPA is supported, or in a delegated RPKI setup. For most networks the record is a short list of their upstream ASNs.

Create an ASPA object: RIPE Portal · ARIN RPKI · APNIC MyAPNIC · ipctl.io RPKI & ROA tools

Related Tools and Guides

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