AS53667 ASPA Check - FranTech Solutions

PONYNET - FranTech Solutions🇺🇸 - ASPA check for AS53667: the upstream transit providers AS53667 has authorized in its RPKI Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) object, and the networks that list AS53667 as their provider. Routers that validate ASPA use these records to detect route leaks in BGP paths.

AS53667 has not published its own ASPA object, but 33 ASNs list it as an authorized upstream provider.

Listed as Upstream By
33 ASNs
Upstream Providers
-
Downstream Customers
33

Peering Topology

AS53667 peering topology: 0 upstream providers and 33 downstream customersNo upstreams. Downstreams: AS11721, AS16909, AS26533, AS30114, AS40929, AS44324, AS44817, AS53340 and more.AS53667 - PONYNET - FranTech SolutionsAS53667PONYNET - FranTech So…AS11721STYLENTECH - StylenTe…AS11721 - STYLENTECH - StylenTech LLCAS16909IMPUT - imputAS16909 - IMPUT - imputAS26533STIBARC-AS-01 - STiBa…AS26533 - STIBARC-AS-01 - STiBaRCAS30114DECIMA-LLC - Decima L…AS30114 - DECIMA-LLC - Decima LLCAS40929MOEDOVE-BN - MoeDoveAS40929 - MOEDOVE-BN - MoeDoveAS44324MOEDOVE-AS MoeDove LLCAS44324 - MOEDOVE-AS MoeDove LLCAS44817AS-RHZAHRA M AlhudaAS44817 - AS-RHZAHRA M AlhudaAS53340FIBERHUB - VegasNAP, …AS53340 - FIBERHUB - VegasNAP, LLCView all 33 downstreams →UPSTREAMSDOWNSTREAMS

Downstream Customers(33)

These ASNs list AS53667 as an authorized upstream provider.

ASNName
AS11721🇺🇸STYLENTECH - StylenTech LLC
AS16909🇺🇸IMPUT - imput
AS26533🇺🇸STIBARC-AS-01 - STiBaRC
AS30114🇺🇸DECIMA-LLC - Decima LLC
AS40929🇺🇸MOEDOVE-BN - MoeDove
AS44324🇺🇸MOEDOVE-AS MoeDove LLC
AS44817🇮🇩AS-RHZAHRA M Alhuda
AS53340🇺🇸FIBERHUB - VegasNAP, LLC
AS54148🇨🇦DYNAMIC-QUANTUM-NETWORKS - Dynamic Quantum Networks
AS54218🇺🇸BERENET - SYSTEM36 L.L.C.
33 total
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About ASPA - what it is and why AS53667 should publish one

ASPA (Autonomous System Provider Authorization) is a cryptographically signed RPKI object specified in the IETF draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile that lets an AS declare which upstream networks are its authorized transit providers. Together with route origin validation (ROV), ASPA enables BGP route leak detection: routers can reject AS-paths in which a network appears as a provider without being authorized. Route leaks are a frequent cause of large routing incidents, and ROV alone cannot detect them because the origin of a leaked route is correct.

AS53667 (PONYNET - FranTech Solutions) has not published an ASPA object. Hops through it are therefore "unknown" to ASPA validation - not invalid, but not protected either. An ASPA object lists every transit provider of the network (or AS0 if it has none) and is created in the RIR's hosted RPKI where ASPA is supported, or in a delegated RPKI setup. For most networks the record is a short list of their upstream ASNs.

Create an ASPA object: RIPE Portal · ARIN RPKI · APNIC MyAPNIC · ipctl.io RPKI & ROA tools

Related Tools and Guides

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